

# FOREIGN POLICY BULLETIN

*An analysis of current international events*



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## Asian Tensions to Tax San Francisco Conference

WASHINGTON — When the State Department began two months ago to make arrangements for the conference on the Japanese peace treaty which is to open in San Francisco on September 4, it expected that the meeting would dramatize the solidarity of the nations outside the Soviet sphere of influence. Instead, the conference threatens now to stress the divisions among some of those nations and perhaps even to widen the divisions.

### *Search for Strength*

The State Department apparently also envisioned the conference as a major engagement in the American strategy of peace. The resulting establishment of good relations with Japan on a sovereign basis and the use of Japanese territory for American military outposts would add to the strength of the United States and thereby bring the West closer to the military equality with the Soviet sphere which Washington is seeking. The assumption is still honored in Washington that the Soviet Union will show a sincere interest in peaceful negotiation with the West when that equality is attained.

However, Communist Chinese comments denouncing the proposed treaty now confronts the West with the possibility that the document might incite a war or, at least, postpone the realization of the conditions that make for real peace. At any rate, the abrupt interruption by North Koreans and Communist Chinese of the negotiations at Kaesong seems to be related to the Japanese treaty. Americans will rightly be vexed, but they need not be astounded if Communist China does not somehow try to bring about a modifica-

tion of the Japanese treaty as the price of peace in Korea.

The changed aspect of the conference results from the decision of the Soviet Union to accept the invitation of the United States to take part in it. In view of Moscow's radical complaints about the treaty draft that Ambassador John Foster

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Dulles, special assistant to Secretary of State Dean Acheson, had worked out with Britain, France, the Philippines, Australia and New Zealand, the State Department did not expect an acceptance when it included Russia in the list of states to be invited. Andrei Gromyko, deputy foreign minister, is to represent the Soviet Union. The assumption is common that he will air the criticisms of Communist China as well as those of his own government.

What he will propose is a matter of guesswork. Students of Soviet Far Eastern policy fall into two camps on this question—those who expect Gromyko to condemn the treaty and refuse to sign it, and those who expect him to condemn it and then sign it. With Washington's suspicions of

Russia heightened by Communist tactics at Kaesong, the signing of the treaty would be taken not as a show of amiability but as a device for keeping open Soviet lines of political and diplomatic communication to Japan.

Whatever course Gromyko follows, the decision of Russia to participate has focused attention on a weakness in the Far Eastern policy of the United States. The State Department—for various reasons—has been unsuccessful in efforts to gain widespread Asian support for this treaty with a leading Asian state. The pact can thus be stigmatized as representing white men's notions of what is best for Japan and to some degree what is best for Asia. Communist China is not participating in the conference; Nationalist China's government-in-exile on Formosa is not participating; neither South nor North Korea is participating; Burma is not participating. Prime Minister Nehru of India rejected the invitation to San Francisco on the general ground that the draft treaty violated his conception of Asia for the Asians. His government, in a note released August 26, informed Washington that it objected to the treaty because it failed to restore Formosa to China, because it provided for separation of the Ryukyus and Bonins from Japan (under a United Nations trusteeship, with the United States as the administering authority), and because it authorizes the stationing of foreign troops in Japan. The Asian participants are to be Japan itself, the Philippine Republic, Indonesia and probably the autonomous states of Indo-China.

In view of the nonrepresentation of hundreds of millions of Asians whose nations

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suffered from Japan's belligerent policy from 1937 to 1945, the San Francisco conference can stimulate the conflict for political influence in Asia. A power unfriendly to the United States might argue to Asians that the conference and the treaty symbolize American lack of sympathy for Asian interests, and in the continuing rivalry for influence in Asia this argument would be useful long after the conference had ended. In this conflict the United States is not bankrupt. Southern Asia is as skeptical of Soviet leadership as it is of American intentions; Thailand and the Philippines depend on the United States for their security. India opposes the American policy of not recognizing the Communist government of China, but an Indian rebuff to the United States is not automatically an Indian gesture of friendship to Russia. One explanation of India's refusal to attend the San Francisco meeting is that Nehru is unwilling to comfort Russia by joining Gromyko in condemning the treaty. Nonetheless, the weakness of American Far Eastern policy is that in order to solidify its relations with Japan, Washington is

willing to risk the deterioration of its relations with other nations in the Orient. The Soviet Union will not likely pass up the opportunity to point this out.

### *Satisfies Japan*

The participation of Russia, however, has not diminished American hopes of bringing the San Francisco meeting to a quick end, thus laying the foundation for an epoch of harmony and interdependence between the United States and Japan. In anticipation, at any rate, the State Department is ready to resist any effort to transfer the Korean war negotiations from Kaesong to San Francisco, informally or directly. Communist Chinese comment on the treaty, including the observation that Peiping would consider the conclusion of the treaty as tantamount to a declaration of war by Japan on China and the Soviet Union, is not taken seriously here, any more than speculation that Russia might land an army of Communist indoctrinated Japanese ex-prisoners-of-war on the island of Hokkaido, 300 miles from

Vladivostok. The Administration appears satisfied that the treaty will fortify the United States against any belligerent outbreaks in Asia, including a resumption and possible spreading of the Korean war.

At present the treaty seems acceptable to the Senate. The objection which Senator William E. Jenner, Republican of Indiana, raised on August 24, that the treaty appeases the Soviet Union by its failure to repudiate the Russian claim to the Kurile Islands and South Sakhalin, is not likely to block approval. The treaty may soon be followed by the negotiation of a security agreement between the United States and Japan. Although apprehension that the treaty may jeopardize his political position in Japan caused Premier Shigeru Yoshida to hesitate in making his decision to head the Japanese delegation to San Francisco, Japanese opinion on the whole reflects satisfaction, and the State Department is more interested in the attitude of Japan than in the attitude of the Soviet Union as the San Francisco conference approaches.

BLAIR BOLLES

## ***Maturing Electorate Revealed at Israeli Poll***

Israel's second parliamentary election was held on July 30, 1951. As widely predicted, it brought one major change—the rise of the liberal General Zionists. It also confirmed Israel's foreign policy of noncooperation with the Soviet Union.

### ***The 1949 Coalition***

Voting for Israel's 120-seat parliament (Knesset) is by proportional representation, through party lists. The first election was held in January 1949, eight months after the establishment of the state, with almost 420,000 registered voters and 25 parties—5 of them as the Religious Bloc supporting one list—participating. The results gave Labor (Mapai), a social democratic, trade-union-led group, 46 seats; the United Workers (Mapam), pro-Soviet, 19; the Religious Bloc, 16; the Freedom (Heruth) party, nationalist, 14; the General Zionists, liberal free-enterprise, 7; the Progressives, off-shoot of the General Zionists but friendly to Labor, 5; the Communists, largely Arab citizens of Israel, 4. The remaining 9 were distributed among several small parties.

Lacking an alternative, Mapai, headed by David Ben-Gurion, veteran labor leader and chief of the then outgoing provisional cabinet, formed an obviously ill-assorted coalition, mainly with the Religious Bloc. Mapam would have forced an alteration

of the foreign policy in favor of the U.S.S.R. Heruth, strongly opposed to the General Federation of Labor (Histadruth), the backbone of Mapai, was too extreme.

That coalition functioned badly. Mapai made many important concessions to the Religious Bloc. It abandoned formulation of a constitution for the country, because the Religious Bloc was against a basic law prohibiting the giving of legal power to organized religion. It refrained from changing the practice, inherited through the British mandatory period from Turkish days, of leaving matters of "personal status"—marriage, divorce and inheritance—entirely to the ecclesiastical authorities and their laws, although there was much demand that these be brought under the civil law and judiciary. It agreed to forbidding import into or sale in the country of meat not slaughtered in conformity with orthodox Jewish dietary laws, although it was evident that only a small minority of the people desired such legislation. It permitted requiring the armed forces to be fed only in accordance with those laws. It continued the school system of the mandatory days, under which education followed four so-called "trends"—labor, orthodox, ultraorthodox and general—although public sentiment, even in labor circles, was swinging toward the idea of a unified, non-partisan school system.

The Religious Bloc, however, perhaps feeling that its chance was then or never, continually pressed for adoption of more of its program. One of its chief demands was for virtually direct party administration of the schools of the orthodox trends, which still were to be paid for by the government. It began to insist upon the enforcement of very rigid Sabbath and religious holiday observances, which is opposed by most of the people and would have immobilized the country. It opposed the drafting of young women for auxiliary military service. It asked that more cabinet ministries be awarded to its members.

Last October Mr. Ben-Gurion resigned as prime minister to force an election that might give him a less troublesome majority. He was persuaded to withdraw that resignation. However, in spite of more concessions to the Religious Bloc, he found his position untenable and resigned again in February. After others had tried and failed to form a workable majority, the President of Israel, Dr. Chaim Weizmann, called for the election of a new parliament.

### ***Religious Issues Subside***

During the ensuing campaign the issues raised by the Religious Bloc almost evaporated. The Bloc itself broke up into four of its five parts. The political contest was principally between Mapai, defending the

predominant position in the economy of the General Federation of Labor, which is the largest owner of businesses and industries in the country, and the General Zionists, who claim to represent freedom of initiative and opposition to monopoly. Bitterness arose over the charge that Mapai was misusing its advantage as the effective governing party to prevent other parties from campaigning among the large number of recent immigrants in their government-administered camps or public-works villages.

The recent election, with approximately 880,000 registered voters—the great increase over 1949 being due mostly to immigration—resulted in Mapai losing one seat, retaining the other 45. Clearly Mapai's fate would have been worse were it not for the

support of many of the new immigrants who, because of the orthodox background of many of them, had been expected by some observers to vote principally for the religious parties. The General Zionists were second with 20. Mapam fell to third place with 15. Then followed Heruth and the Mizrahi Religious Workers (one of the old Religious Bloc) each with 8, the Communists and the Mapai Arabs each with 5, and the Progressives with 4. A total of 17 parties, including 4 of the former Religious Bloc, put up lists.

At the time that this is written, three weeks after the election, Israel still has no cabinet. Ben-Gurion has been trying to find a way to accomplish the apparently impossible task of forming a working majority without giving a "balance of power"

position to the pro-Soviet Mapam, the anti-monopoly General Zionists, the religious parties, or the Arabs.

The election results indicate that the electorate is maturing, that it remains socialistically inclined but attaches less meaning to generalizations than to concrete results and specific policies, and that in the main its tendency is moderate, away from extremes of nationalism, religion or socialism. For the first time there may be a democratically-desirable meaningful parliamentary opposition, which might bring some balance of forces to the country.

EDWARD A. NORMAN

(Mr. Norman, who has been in close touch with events in Palestine for more than 20 years, is president of the American Fund for Israel Institutions.)

## **Rockefeller, UN Reports Highlight Point Four Issues**

Two significant reports have recently appeared dealing with the problem of developing underdeveloped countries—*Partners in Progress*, submitted to President Truman by the International Development Advisory Board headed by Nelson Rockefeller, and *Measures for the Economic Development of Under-Developed Countries*, written by a group of experts for the United Nations. Both stress the need for considerable external aid if the process of development is to be accelerated but propose somewhat different procedures for implementing foreign aid programs. In general the UN report reflects the attitudes of the underdeveloped countries themselves.

The UN report, stimulating because of the light it sheds on the development problem, raises more questions than it answers. Often tentative and tantalizing because it is couched in general rather than specific terms, this report is perhaps the best distillation to date of the current discussion on the nature of the development process in countries where there has not yet emerged a spontaneous drive toward higher living standards through more intensified use of resources.

### **Advanced Nations' Policies**

The report deals illuminatingly and undogmatically with a whole series of issues concerning development, notably the role of government in mobilizing and channeling resources; the intimate relation between political and economic factors in development (a problem slighted in much of the current discussion of technical aid); the importance of underemployment in determining the relative weight and tim-

ing of agricultural development as compared with industrial development; and the problem of priorities as between investment in human resources and in capital equipment.

Reviewers have directed their fire at the last few pages of the report which propose a thorough overhauling of those policies of the advanced nations which affect underdeveloped economies. For example, subsidies to United States cotton exporters or to wool and sugar growers injure underdeveloped countries producing these items for export. Export and import transactions between developed and underdeveloped countries need to be coordinated as to prices and timing. The report estimates that more than \$10 billion of capital must be imported annually by the underdeveloped countries if per capita incomes are to increase by approximately 2 per cent per year. The report, however, does not contain an extended appendix giving the data and methodology on which its findings depend. Its suggestion implies a major and sustained contribution by the advanced countries. Much of the contribution during the first few years is to be in the form of grants, the funds to be used to prepare personnel and programs in the underdeveloped countries for the absorption of loan capital. The report proposes the creation of a UN International Development Authority to help underdeveloped areas.

The conclusions of the report may be summed up as follows. Failure of past undertakings has transformed the requirements of the development process, which is becoming increasingly conscious and deliberate. Exploration and experimentation are needed if development patterns

are to evolve in the middle ground between the *laissez-faire* tradition of the Western world and the totalitarian Communist control of the whole economy. Development is painful and difficult, requiring a major effort by the participants. If development is to proceed rapidly while avoiding complete regimentation, considerable help is needed from abroad. These findings are a far cry from the easy assumptions of the Point Four program, which counts on getting large results quickly from small expenditures.

### **United States Program**

*Partners in Progress*, the so-called Rockefeller report, was prepared primarily as a plea for a certain policy—namely, that our huge rearmament program must not lose sight of the needs of underdeveloped countries for our aid, and that to this end we should set up a central agency to allocate some of our scarce goods and equipment for the production of capital goods needed to develop underdeveloped countries. To strengthen this plea the Rockefeller report links progress in the underdeveloped countries directly to our own immediate self-interests in two ways: by emphasizing our need for greatly expanded strategic materials, most of which come from underdeveloped countries; and by expressing the fear that if we do nothing, these areas may become ripe for communism.

Emphasis on what we can immediately get out of underdeveloped countries in the way of increased raw materials is a good selling-point with the American public. However, it raises doubts and suspicions in the nonindustrialized countries, because really sustained aid in development re-



quires a considerable time during which these countries import more than they export. (The United States had a passive trade balance for the greater part of the nineteenth century.) Moreover, the majority of underdeveloped countries aim to liberate themselves from undue dependence on highly unstable raw-material exports. Total exports already run to almost 20 per cent of the national incomes of underdeveloped countries, according to the UN report. This report ably summarizes the various considerations leading underdeveloped countries toward considerable economic autarchy despite the fact that those among them producing strategic raw ma-

terials—such as rubber and tin—have momentarily a highly valued source of foreign exchange with which to purchase foreign machinery and equipment.

The Rockefeller report proposes bilateral administration of development by a joint commission composed of the United States and each recipient country. Many underdeveloped countries would prefer a multilateral approach through the United Nations. Quite aside from this matter of preference, can American administrators—especially in this tense period when such a premium is placed on ideological orthodoxy—see the problem in its new setting and transcend American precedents of

economic development? Neither report deals adequately with how aid from abroad can simultaneously work through the existing governments of underdeveloped countries (both the UN and the United States have no choice but to work in this way) and at the same time induce these governments to institute fundamental reforms, notably land reform, which would undermine the economic base of important groups that occupy leading positions in the governments of these countries.

HELEN B. LAMB

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## FPA Bookshelf

### BOOKS ON RUSSIA AND EASTERN EUROPE

*Justice in Russia: An Interpretation of Soviet Law*, by Harold J. Berman. Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1950. \$4.75.

Another volume in the excellent series of studies published by the Russian Research Center at Harvard University. The author, assistant professor of law at the Harvard Law School, examines Soviet legal concepts and practices without passion or prejudice and points out the various elements—Russian tradition, the ideas of Marx, Lenin and Stalin, and what he calls the “parental” attitude of the Soviet government toward the citizen—which have gone into the making of Soviet law. A valuable contribution to a field little studied in the United States.

*America Faces Russia: Russian-American Relations From Early Times to Our Day*, by Thomas A. Bailey. Ithaca, Cornell University Press, 1950. \$4.

Writing in his accustomed lively style, Professor Bailey of Stanford University recapitulates the uneven course of relations between the United States and Russia during nearly two centuries, pointing up many instances in which events of Tsarist times compare to a striking degree with contemporary developments. Professor Bailey clearly realizes that Communist ideology has introduced a new dimension into Russia's otherwise persisting foreign policy, but his most useful advice to the United States is also that which served Britain well under comparable circumstances—and that is patience in dealing with the Russians.

*Balkan Caesar: Tito vs. Stalin*, by Leigh White. New York, Scribner, 1951. \$2.75.

A well-known foreign correspondent writes in highly critical terms about Marshal Tito, whom he describes as “a far more dangerous opponent than Franco ever was,” but advises the United States to turn Tito's heresy to its own ends.

*Rumania: Political Problems of an Agrarian State*, by Henry L. Roberts. New Haven, Yale University Press, 1951. \$6.

This thoughtful, carefully documented volume on Rumania's problems before and since World War II represents a real contribution to the all-too-scant literature of genuine information about Eastern European countries as distinguished from mere denunciations of Russia and communism.

The author, who teaches history at Columbia University, adds interest to his book by raising questions about Rumania's political and economic development which are applicable to other underdeveloped areas.

### RECENT BOOKS ON ASIA

*Blunder in Asia*, by Harrison Forman. New York, Didier, 1951. \$3.

A journalist's account of recent events and trends in Communist China based on personal experience, combined with an appeal to the West to provide an alternative to communism in Asia by offering something better—“social and economic reforms which will lift the standard of living of Asia's impoverished millions.”

*East of Home*, by Santha Rama Rau. New York, Harper, 1951. \$3.

The American-educated daughter of one of India's leading statesmen and diplomats records in intimate and revealing terms her rediscovery of Asia as seen in Japan, China, Indo-China and Bali—a warmly human yet disturbing book.

*The Malays: A Cultural History*, by Richard Winstedt. New York, Philosophical Library, 1950. \$3.75.

The complex problems of a people whose heritage is a compound of the ancient cultures of China, India and the Muslim world come alive in this scholarly account of the origin, migrations, language, religion, literature, arts and crafts of the Malays, as well as their social, political, legal and economic systems.

*Time for Tapioca*, by Charlotte Stryker. New York, Crowell, 1951. \$3.

An informal portrait of an American family's experience in Indonesia.

*Failure in Japan: With Keystones for a Positive Policy*, by Robert B. Textor. New York, John Day, 1951. \$3.

A stinging indictment of occupation policies, which, after admirable beginnings, have tended, in the author's view, to encourage undemocratic elements in Japanese life at the expense of the democratic and to lay unstable foundations for the future, not only for Japan itself but for all of Asia. As a civilian Japanese-speaking employee of the occupation, Mr. Textor gathered first-hand information for his book.

*Time of Fallen Blossoms*, by Allan S. Clifton. New York, Knopf, 1951. \$3.

The experiences of an Australian in Japan in the first year of the occupation. Because of his knowledge of the Japanese language and his affection for the people, he has been able to see and describe aspects of Japanese life and thought usually closed to the foreign observer.

*Kakemono: A Sketch Book of Post-War Japan*, by Honor Tracy. New York, Coward-McCann, 1950. \$3.

Through this record of her life in Japan in 1948, an English writer conveys her respect for the charm and dignity of Japanese life and her doubts about our efforts to “democratize” the country.

*The Rise and Fall of the Japanese Empire*, by David H. James. New York, Macmillan, 1951. \$5.

Following some preliminary chapters giving a brief sketch of Japanese history, the author, drawing heavily on his own experience, describes in detail the expansion of Japan, as it sought to create its “Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere,” and its final collapse.

*We of Nagasaki: The Story of Survivors in an Atomic Wasteland*, by Takashi Nagai. New York, Duell, 1951. \$2.75.

Personal accounts of what happened to some residents of the second city to feel the impact of an atom bomb, told in their own words.

*Geography of the Pacific*, edited by Otis W. Freeman. New York, Wiley, 1951. \$10.

An invaluable compilation of geographic, anthropological and economic data about the various island groups in the Pacific, prepared by authorities who have been in the areas they describe. The contributors include Kenneth P. Emory, Curtis A. Manchester, Jr., Clifford M. Zierrer, Robert G. Bowman, John W. Coulter, Neal M. Bowers, Leonard Mason, Joseph E. Spencer, Edwin H. Bryan, Jr., Anthony E. Sokol, Walter R. Hacker and Charles M. Davis.

*War in Korea*, by Marguerite Higgins. Garden City, N. Y., Doubleday, 1951. \$2.75.

The human side of the war in Korea movingly and revealingly told by a correspondent for the New York *Herald Tribune*. Profusely illustrated with photographs.

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